I just read NYTimes article about the discussion to use underground nuclear explosion to seal the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/us/03nuke.html?hp. The idea may sound crazy, but experiments were conducted in 1970s in the USSR. The places are called Lira and Azgir nuclear testing sites in Western Kazakhstan, you can read more on http://www.nnc.kz/en/about/activity/radioecology.html .
Kazakhstan's National Nuclear Center continues environmental monitoring of the sites. I am not an expert in this field, but from what I understand an underground nuclear explosion creates a sealed cavity that serves as a container, which keeps natural gas and condensate form leaking into the ground. I have thought about this project when InnoCentive announced its "Emergency Response 2.0 : Solutions to Respond to Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico" on https://gw.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/overview/9383447 .
At that time I thought it could be nearly impossible to place a nuclear device 1 km deep into the water and further into the seabed. But I guess, some of the scientists that were involved with the project decided to give the idea a shot, literally. I knew that both underwater and underground tests were routinely done in the past (see http://alturl.com/v7x6 ), but combining two in one could be a real challenge.
I agree with NYTimes that such risky idea is cannot be seriously considered. However, as crazy as the idea sounds, the fact that it got front page coverage in NYTimes (!!!"...What about nuking the well?") suggests that both BP and the Federal government are running out of serious options. Or perhaps, public opinion is being prepared for an option that includes conventional explosion to stop the spill, which looks much more acceptable vis-a-vie a nuclear option.
Here is an abstract from the paper called Reduction of Risks from Lira Underground Nuclear Facilities at Karachaganak Oil-and-Gas Complex published by National Nuclear Center researchers in 2008:
"T. I. Ageyeva2, A. Zh. Tuleushev2 and V. V. Podenezhko2
(2) Institute of Nuclear Physics, Almaty, Kazakhstan
The theme of this article is the investigations of radioactive contamination within and around underground cavities created by underground nuclear detonations performed in connection with the operation of oil and gas condensate fields. Underground storages of gas condensate are not maintained for a long time. The results from the large-scale complex indicate the absence of a real threat from nuclear objects on the environment. However, there is a potential danger connected with possible changes in the geological environment containing the underground storages of condensates. The pressure created in the cavities is the controlling parameter of the conditions in the cavities. Laboratory investigations of a condensate from the underground cavities confirm the absence of caesium-137 and strontium-90 and the presence of tritium. The strategy of closing off the cavities with the application of filling the cavity space with loose or helium materials is designed. The basic objective of the subsequent works is to decrease the environmental risks associated with oil-and-gas operations and underground storage of condensates.
Keywords cavities - underground nuclear detonations - condensate storage - LIRA - Kazakhstan"
Source: http://www.springerlink.com/content/r3w0jgvmx87tv332/
Showing posts with label Deepwater Horizon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deepwater Horizon. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Realpolitik of the Blame Game
After BP’s numerous failed attempts to stop oil contamination in the Gulf of Mexico its corporate image is in ruins. As BP’s public image reached its saturation limits for criticism, the political debate redirects public attention from the oil company to the Federal government. With the accident rolling into its sixth week, the Obama administration is forced to answer “Who is to blame?” and “What to do?” In short, political pressure and public anger demand swift satisfaction.
In this respect, Obama's decision to begin criminal investigations into the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the oil spill may give such satisfaction. Unfortunately, it is short-lived and may prove counterproductive in the long-run. Criminal inquiries into the cause of the oil spill is likely to narrow down the scope of post-mortem analysis to near physical and temporal proximity of the accident. In other words, the investigation will focus on people who made decisions as the accident emerged.
After the Exxon Valdes accident, the public was given a scapegoat, Capitan Hazelwood, who was singlehandedly blamed to cause the accident. Although, he was later cleared of the charge being drunk at the time of the accident, he had never cleared his name from the stigma of causing of the biggest oil spill in US history (until current accident). There were more systemic problems such as functional and interoperable navigation systems on board the ship and on the shore of Alaska, the culture of tolerance to safety problems among the oil executives and public official, etc. However, systemic factors tend to “spread the blame” and lack the luxury of targeted blame, thus satisfaction of punishment. Simple and straightforward causes are always easier to describe and accept. I hope to be wrong, but it is likely that we can expect several Capitan Hazelwoods from BP and its subcontractors who could be “scarified” to satisfy public outcry. However, it is unlikely that such narrow view can help us understand the complexity of the accident.
It is in our human nature to go back in time and look for a single event, which could have prevented to the catastrophe from happening. The bigger the accident, the stronger is our temptation to reverse time. Inability to reverse the situation results in anger, dissatisfaction and need for revenge. These emotions have to be channeled one way or the other. What make the case with the oil spill unique is the fact that the public is given a rare opportunity to be part of the accident as it emerges. The public feels helpless to reverse time and to contain the accident. Old and new media channels enables people to get first-hand accounts of the environmental impact on the ocean's seabed, the coast and wildlife. As the result, it is natural for people to ask who is in charge and who is to blame. If those who are in charge do not act swiftly and find those who are to blame, the public could blame those who are in charge. If those who were in charge yesterday do not blame those who are in charge today, then those who were in charge yesterday are to get blamed themselves and vice versa. The same is true with BP and its numerous subcontractors.
Unfortunately realpolitik of the blame game creates an environment in which each player is concerned with own political and legal liabilities. Criminal inquiry adds more gasoline to the flame. Starting the investigation before accident’s containment is almost like investigating causes of an air crash with airplane still in the air. Perhaps, such approach could give unique perspective, but more likely it will downgrade itself to simplified description of immediate events with operators and decision makers who were unfortunate enough to be in close proximity as the accident emerged.
In this respect, Obama's decision to begin criminal investigations into the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the oil spill may give such satisfaction. Unfortunately, it is short-lived and may prove counterproductive in the long-run. Criminal inquiries into the cause of the oil spill is likely to narrow down the scope of post-mortem analysis to near physical and temporal proximity of the accident. In other words, the investigation will focus on people who made decisions as the accident emerged.
After the Exxon Valdes accident, the public was given a scapegoat, Capitan Hazelwood, who was singlehandedly blamed to cause the accident. Although, he was later cleared of the charge being drunk at the time of the accident, he had never cleared his name from the stigma of causing of the biggest oil spill in US history (until current accident). There were more systemic problems such as functional and interoperable navigation systems on board the ship and on the shore of Alaska, the culture of tolerance to safety problems among the oil executives and public official, etc. However, systemic factors tend to “spread the blame” and lack the luxury of targeted blame, thus satisfaction of punishment. Simple and straightforward causes are always easier to describe and accept. I hope to be wrong, but it is likely that we can expect several Capitan Hazelwoods from BP and its subcontractors who could be “scarified” to satisfy public outcry. However, it is unlikely that such narrow view can help us understand the complexity of the accident.
It is in our human nature to go back in time and look for a single event, which could have prevented to the catastrophe from happening. The bigger the accident, the stronger is our temptation to reverse time. Inability to reverse the situation results in anger, dissatisfaction and need for revenge. These emotions have to be channeled one way or the other. What make the case with the oil spill unique is the fact that the public is given a rare opportunity to be part of the accident as it emerges. The public feels helpless to reverse time and to contain the accident. Old and new media channels enables people to get first-hand accounts of the environmental impact on the ocean's seabed, the coast and wildlife. As the result, it is natural for people to ask who is in charge and who is to blame. If those who are in charge do not act swiftly and find those who are to blame, the public could blame those who are in charge. If those who were in charge yesterday do not blame those who are in charge today, then those who were in charge yesterday are to get blamed themselves and vice versa. The same is true with BP and its numerous subcontractors.
Unfortunately realpolitik of the blame game creates an environment in which each player is concerned with own political and legal liabilities. Criminal inquiry adds more gasoline to the flame. Starting the investigation before accident’s containment is almost like investigating causes of an air crash with airplane still in the air. Perhaps, such approach could give unique perspective, but more likely it will downgrade itself to simplified description of immediate events with operators and decision makers who were unfortunate enough to be in close proximity as the accident emerged.
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